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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to simulate the proposed modality in mar-
ket access and estimate its potential impacts on Korea's tariff profile. 
By accommodating a tiered formula for tariff reduction, the modality 
attempts to harmonize tariffs across products and countries. When no 
flexibility  in  tariff  cuts  is  taken  into  account,  Korea  would  face  up  to 
68  per cent  r ed uct i o n i n t a r iffs  in  an  aver a ge t er m ( t h e ba sel in e). The 
p r o v i s i o n  o f  s e n s i t i v e  p r o d u c t s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  t a r i f f  c u t s  a r e  a l lowed  to 
d e v i a t e  f r o m  t h e  t i e r e d  f o r m u l a  b y  t w o - t h i r d s  a t  a  m a x i m u m  i s  l ikely 
to bring about 11 percentage points of maximum tariff saving effects 
compared  with  the  baseline  case.  Besides,  Korea  would  be  able  to 
max imi ze s av in gs  i n t ar iff r educt io n s by 2 5 p er cen t age p o in t s by  des-
i g n a t i n g  s p e ci a l  p r o d uc t s .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  c r u ci a l  f o r  t h e  c o u n try to  se-
c u r e  t h e  r i g h t  t o  u s e  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  s p e c i a l  p r o d u c t s  a s  a  d e velop-
ing  member  country.  Finally,  it  is  shown  that  tariff  cuts  for  tropical 
products  would  be  a  stiff  challenge  since  they  include  many  im-
portant  products  including  rice,  red  pepper,  Korean  citrus  and  ses-
ame  oil. 
Ⅰ. Introduction
Major achievements of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) 
include the abolishment of quantitative barriers to agricultural trade and multi-
lateral disciplines on domestic agricultural policies (Josling 2003). In addition, 
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the Article 20 of the URAA provides a mandate to continue the process of fun-
damental reform in terms of substantial progressive reduction in support and 
protection.
The agricultural negotiations which started from 2000 on the basis of 
this mandate were further stimulated by the launch of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA), or the Doha Round, in the next year. The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration confirmed the commitment toward comprehensive negotiations aim-
ing at substantial improvements in market access, gradual reduction of all forms 
of export subsidies, and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic sup-
port (WTO 2001).
Despite intensive work for negotiations, the DDA has not come to an 
end (as of mid-March 2008). The July Framework Agreement adopted in 2004 
paved the way for continued negotiations and revitalization of the round after 
a series of unsuccessful efforts to agree on modalities. But the July package 
contained only directions and principles for reducing support and protection. A 
couple of significant agreements came out during the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference in 2005. At the meeting, WTO ministers agreed to eliminate export 
subsidies by 2013 and allowed duty-free and quota-free imports from the Least 
Developed Countries (LDC).
The first draft of agricultural modality in 2007, which was circulated 
by Falconer, the chairperson of the agricultural negotiations, gathered a mo-
mentum for a serious engagement in the negotiations by member countries. This 
was made possible because it suggested formulas for reducing tariffs and 
trade-distorting subsidies. Nevertheless, the text lacked full details of thorny is-
sues, including special products and a special safeguard mechanism for the de-
veloping countries, and other fringe topics.
Despite having more than 200 parentheses or options to resolve the re-
vised text in early 2008, the first draft comprehensively deals with pending is-
sues and provides a basis for concluding the talks. It tables workable rules on 
three pillars, market access, domestic support and export competition such that 
member countries are able to weigh the balance of commitments and the extent 
of reforms to make.
Previous studies have extensively covered market access issues raised 
during the agricultural negotiations (Lim et al. 2006a; Lim et al. 2006b; Suh 
et al. 2007; Suh and Lim 2005). But they were largely limited to descriptive 
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scenario analyses based on hypothetical tariff cutting formulas and criteria.
The purpose of this paper is to simulate the proposed formulas for cut-
ting tariffs in the chair’s revised modality paper and estimate its potential effects 
on the tariff profile for Korea. In doing so, it analyzes core elements of market 
access and addresses strategic options that the country may consider to take.
Ⅱ. A Summary of the Modality for Tariff Reductions1 
1. Tiered Formula for Tariff Cuts
The chair’s revised text for tariff cuts adopted the so-called tiered formula by 
which higher final bound tariffs are subject to larger reduction rates.2 This 
tiered approach is incorporated in part to harmonize tariff levels across products 
and countries as well.
Table 1 displays reduction rates for each range of bound tariffs. 
Developed countries reduce up to 73 percent of bound tariffs over a five-year 
period. The minimum average cut on tariffs is set at 54 percent. The special 
and differential treatment for developing countries includes 2/3 of the cut for 
developed countries over the implementation period of 8 years. The maximum 
overall average cut on tariffs is 36 percent for developing countries.
TABLE  1.    Tiered  Formula  for  Tariff  Reductions
Developed Countries Developing Countries
Bound tariff (%) Reduction rate (%) Bound tariff (%) Reduction rate (%)
< 20 48~52 < 30 32~35
20~50 55~60 30~80 37~40
50~75 62~65 80~130 41~43
75 < 66~73 130 < 44~49
Source: WTO (2008)
  1 Among many issues in market access, this section is intended to address only those 
rules that are directly connected with tariff reductions. In other words, it excludes 
other market access issues such as tariff quota administration, methods to calculate 
domestic  consumption,  and  special  safeguards.
  2  The  revised  text  is  available  from  the  WTO  website  at  http://  http://www.wt-
o.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_feb08_e.htm.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 108
Tariff ceilings are not explicitly mentioned; but when more than 4 per-
cent of tariff lines exceed the tariff level of 100 percent after tariff reduction 
commitment, the country should further expand tariff quota volumes. Many im-
porting countries including Korea view this clause as indirect tariff ceilings.
2. Sensitive Products
A developed country is able to designate sensitive products up to 6 percent of 
dutiable tariff lines, while a developing country has the right to designate sensi-
tive products up to 8 percent. Tariff cuts for sensitive products are allowed to 
deviate from the tiered reduction formula by one-third, one-half or two-thirds 
of the reduction. For example, when designated as a sensitive product, a bound 
rate of 270 percent for red pepper would be lowered to 144, 176, or 207 per-
cent, respectively given the developed countries’ tiered rate of 70 percent.
In exchange for the allowed deviation from normal cuts, what’s re-
quired is to expand tariff quota expansion in terms of domestic consumption. 
Table 2 shows a positive relationship between the levels of deviation and tariff 
quota expansion. For example, the two-thirds deviations need up to 6 percent 
of domestic consumption as additional tariff quota.
T A B L E  2 .   T r e a t m e n t  f o r   Sensitive  Products
Deviation
Tariff Quota Expansion as Percentage of Domestic Consumption (%)
Developed Countries Developing Countries
1/3 3.0 ~ 5.0 2.0 ~ 3.3
1/2 3.5 ~ 5.5 2.3 ~ 3.7
2/3 4.0 ~ 6.0 2.7 ~ 4.0
Source: WTO (2008)
3. Special Products
Developing countries have the right to self-designate special products on the ba-
sis of three criteria, food security, livelihood security and rural development and 
a12 illustrative list of indicators. It suggests minimum and maximum entitle-
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Table 3 summarizes rather complex treatment for special products. The 
minimum entitlement can be eligible for either no cut or some reductions. The 
rest special products are likely to be guided by 8 to 25 percent cuts.
T A B L E  3 .   T r e a t m e n t  f or  Special  Products
Share of Tariff Lines (%) Tariff Cut (%)





Other topics that have something to do with tariff reductions are the liberaliza-
tion of trade in tropical products and tariff escalation. The text lists 94 tropical 
products at HS 6 digit levels. The number of tropical products is further ex-
panded from the list of the Uruguay Round.
Table 4 describes two options for treatment of tropical products, which 
must be applied on top of the tiered formula application. Thresholds for bound 
tariffs are either 10 percent or 25 percent above which the tariff would be re-
duced by up to 85 percent and others are to be lowered to 0.
TABLE  4.    Treatment  for  Tropical  Products
Option Bound Tariff (%) Treatment
1 ≤ 25 Reduce to 0
25 < 85 percent cut
2 < 10 Reduce to 0
10  ≤
66~73 percent cut and tariffs in the top band will be 
reduced by tariff escalation tariff cut for the band 
raised by 2 percent.
Source: WTO (2008)
Regarding tariff escalation, the modality draft provides a list of primary 
and processed products. Their numbers are 23 and 65 at HS 4 or 6 digit levels, Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 110
respectively. Tariff cuts for the processed products fall in the next highest band 
in the tiered formula reduction. A reduction rate of a processed product in the 
top band is equal to either 1.3 times the cut or 6 points larger than the cut.3 
But the resulting gap between the primary and processed products would be 
within 5 percentage points. The treatment for tariff escalation does not apply 
to sensitive products, and developing countries in a position to do so are en-
couraged to adopt this modality.
Ⅲ. Characteristics of the Bound Tariffs
1. Tariff Landscape for Korea
Korea has 1,452 tariff lines at the HS 10 digit level.4 Rice is only non-tar-
iffication product accounting for 16 tariff lines. There are 29 products with zero 
tariffs and the number of products over 100 percent of tariffs including rice ac-
counts for almost 10 percent of the total tariff lines.
Figure 1 shows a snapshot of the current tariff structure. Maniocs have 
the highest tariff at 887 percent followed by pellets, groats and meal, and other 
cereals with 800 percent tariffs. Various Korean ginseng products are also pro-
tected by high tariffs of 754 percent. Other mega tariff products include sesame 
seeds, green and red beans, soya beans, sweet potatoes, ginger, sweet corn, 
starches, green tea, garlic and red pepper.
It is worth to note that Korea has the tariff quota (TRQ) system for 
63 products whose imports are governed by the established quota and in-quota 
and out-of-quota tariffs. Covering 190 tariff lines, most TRQ products are re-
garded as sensitive products.5 The mean of in-quota tariffs is 18 percent while 
  3 For the case of developed countries, the cut rates become either 66~73 percent or 
72~79  percent.
  4 The 1,452 tariff lines are registered on the country’s Implementation Schedule. As 
such, the following analysis will be based on the established tariff lines. But Korea 
increased  the  number  of  tariff  lines  to  1,469  in  2007.
  5  Some  of  significant  TRQ  products  include  garlic,  red  pepper,  onions,  orange,  gin-
seng,  Korean  citrus,  milk  powder,  barley,  green  tea,  starches,  sesame  seeds,  soya 
beans,  potatoes  and  pine  nuts.Impacts of the Doha Round on Korea's Agricultural Tariff Profile 111
that of out-of-quota rates is 335 percent. This sheds light on the fact that why 
TRQ products are deemed to be important in the trade talks.
FIGURE  1.    Landscape  of  the  Bound  Tariffs  for  Korea
Source: Derived from ROK(1994)
Applied tariffs are generally equal to the bound tariffs such that there 
is no overhang tariff phenomenon in Korea. In addition, the bound tariffs are 
mostly in the form of ad valorem tariffs except 76 products which are allowed 
to apply the higher rate between ad valorem and specific tariffs. Major products 
that have been applied by specific tariffs include sesame seeds, jujubes, garlic, 
brackens and white silk.
2. Comparative Characteristics
Figure 2 compares average and maximum bound tariffs among key member 
countries. The average bound tariff for Korea is 63.2 percent at a HS 10 digit 
level, which turns out to be close to the average of non-OECD countries.6 But 
compared with other key member countries, Korea’s average tariff level appears 
to be large. For example, the mean rates for United States and the European 
Union are 11 percent and 23 percent, respectively. The OECD average is 36 
  6 When excluded zero tariffs and the 16 tariff lines for rice, the only non-tariffication 
product,  the  average  tariff  goes  up  by  1.3  percentage  points.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 112
percent and Japan has the level of 42 percent. India keeps about two times larger 
mean tariff than Korea’s.
As for maximum tariffs, Japan records the highest rate of 1,706 percent 
for milk powder. Japan also has the largest gap between the highest and the 
mean tariffs followed by Korea, Canada and the United States. Unlike Korea, 
many countries have ‘water’ in their tariffs.7
FIGURE  2.    Average  and  the  Highest  Bound  Tariffs  in  Agriculture
Source: WTO(2006); Choi et al.(2002); OECD(1999)
Ⅳ. Effects of Tariff Cuts 
1. The Baseline
Table 5 summarizes the consequence of applying the tiered formula for tariff 
cuts without taking account of any flexibility allowed, such as designating sen-
  7 Studying major agricultural products imported by importing countries, Podbury and 
Roberts  (2003)  claims  that  the  average  overhang  tariff  ranges  from  37  percent  to 
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sitive products and special products. Hence, this result can be considered as the 
baseline outcome.
The mean tariff after the cut would range from 21 percent to 38 per-
cent, and the corresponding reduction rates are between 40 percent and 68 per-
cent depending on the country status. These requirements are far larger than the 
reduction rates at the Uruguay Round, 24 percent and 36 percent, respectively.




Developed country Developing country
Average tariff (%) 65 21~25 36~38
Reduction rate (%) - 62~68 40~44
Table 6 confirms that the application of the tiered formula is quite ef-
fective in addressing tariff peaks (over 100 percent of tariff) especially under 
developed country’s requirement. The number of tariff lines for tariff peaks 
would go down from 126 to 62 at the very least. Under a developing country’s 
status, Korea may be able to keep about 8 percent of its tariff lines as high 
tariffs. 
TABLE  6.    Tariff  Peaks:  The  Baseline
Initial position
Reduction categories
Developed country Developing country
Number of tariff line 126 62~78 108
Proportion in the total 
tariff line (%) 94 ~ 6 8
Nevertheless, many tariff peaks would be subject to drastic cuts. Figure 
3 represents the tariffs before and after reductions for selected products. The 
lowest tariffs of red pepper and garlic after reduction would be 82 percent and 
110 percent, respectively. The ginseng’s tariff would drop from 754 percent to 
230 percent with a maximum cut.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 114
FIGURE  3.    Tariff  Cuts  for  Selected  Products:  The  Baseline
Note: ‘Before’=initial bound tariff; ‘dc’=developed country; ‘DC’=developing country.
2. Sensitive Products
As suggested by previous researches, this study assumes rice, barley, red pep-
per, garlic, onion, beef, pork, chicken, milk powders, Korean citrus, ginseng, 
sesame seeds, chestnuts and others to be designated as sensitive products (Lee 
et al. 2006, Sung 2006, Han 2006, Lee et al. 2005, Suh et al. 2005, and Lim 
et al. 2003). Tariff deviations from the tiered formula are 1/3 at a minimum 
and 2/3 at a maximum.
It also assumes two scenarios for the case of developing country. In 
the first scenario, rice is assumed as the only special product. The second sce-
nario presumes 2 percent of the tariff lines as special products which are sub-
ject to 5 percent of tariff reductions. The assumed special products are rice, red 
pepper, garlic and Korean citrus, consisting of 29 tariff lines.
For the developed country’s case, the application of the tiered formula 
toward the proportions of sensitive products amounting to 4 percent and 6 per-
cent of the total tariff lines would yield average tariff rates between 22.1 and 
29.8 percent (Table 7). These are equivalent to the reductions of 54 and 66 per-
cent respectively, compared with the initial average tariff of 65 percent. A 
worthwhile point here is that Korea could meet the minimum reduction require-Impacts of the Doha Round on Korea's Agricultural Tariff Profile 115
ment, the 54 percent cut. Despite the allowed deviations, the average tariff 
would be cut by more than half. However, utilizing the flexibility of sensitive 
products could save the reduction rates by between 2 and 9 percent compared 
with the case of the baseline. The more sensitive products, the larger savings 
in tariff reductions. The greater deviations, the smaller tariff cuts.
TABLE  7.    Tariff  Reductions  for  Sensitive  Products:  A  Developed  Country  Case
Proportion of sensitive products 4% 6%
Deviation from tiered formula cut 6% 1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3
Average tariff (%) 22.1~25.8 23.5~27.1 23.6~27.1 26.5~29.8
Difference in the reduction rate from the 
baseline (%) 2.0~2.2% 4.0~4.4 4.1~4.5 8.2~8.9
























































Note: Onion, potatoes, barley and natural honey are not sensitive products under the 4 
percent criteria such that their tariffs are cut without the deviations.
Table 8 shows the tariff cut results under the scenario one for the case 
of developing country. The average tariffs would range from 38 to 44 percent, 
which are equal to 32 and 41 percent of reductions, respectively. If it is the 
latter case, Korea would have the right to lower the reduction rate to the max-
imum rate of 36 percent. Designation of sensitive products is likely to save tar-
iff cuts by 3 to 9 percentage points. Interestingly enough, the saving effect in 
tariff cuts under the 8 percent criteria appears to be smaller than that of the 
6 percent criteria in the developed country case. In addition, there is no tariff 
reduction effect from special products because rice, the only special product, 
does not have tariffs.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 116
TABLE  8.    Tariff  Reductions  for  Sensitive  Products:  Scenario  1  for  a  Developing 
Country  Case
Proportion of sensitive products 5.3% 8%
Deviation from tiered formula cut 8% 1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3
Average tariff (%)
1) 37.9~40.3 40.0~42.2 38.7~41.0 41.6~43.6
Difference in the reduction rate from the 
baseline (%)
2) 2.9~3.2 5.8~6.4 4.0~4.4 8.0~8.9














































































Note: 1) The average tariff refers to simple means of all tariff lines after applying 
reduction rates.
2) The difference refers to a gap of average tariff rates before and after reductions.
3) Onion, potatoes, barley and natural honey are now bounded by the 5.3 percent 
criterion. The 8 percent criterion is assumed to add condensed milk, whey, 
cheese and potato starch as sensitive products.
The average tariffs under the scenario 2 increase a little to between 39 
and 45 percent (Table 9). Only 1 percentage point difference between the two 
scenarios highlights the fact that rice accounts for more than half of special 
products. The consequent tariff reduction rates extend from 31 to 40 percent. 
Like the previous case, Korea would be able to modulate tariff cuts at 36 
percent. The largest tariff saving effects by 11 percentage points have been ac-
crued from designating 8 percent of sensitive products.Impacts of the Doha Round on Korea's Agricultural Tariff Profile 117
TABLE  9.    Tariff  Reductions  for  Sensitive  Products:  Scenario  2  for  a  Developing 
Country  Case
Proportion of sensitive products 5.3% 8%
Deviation from tiered formula cut 8% 1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3
Average tariff (%)1) 39~41 40~43 40~42 43~45
Difference in the reduction rate from the 
baseline (%)2)
3.7~4.1 6.4~7.0 5.4~6.0 9.7~10.8

















Note: Explanation of 1) and 2), and tariffs for sensitive products are the same as Table 
9. Having special products leaves room to add extra sensitive products,  but they 
are not shown here.
3. Special Products
Table 10 shows three scenarios constructed by the number of special products 
and its corresponding tariff cuts. The proportions of special products rise from 
8 to 14 and 20 percent, and thus the number of sensitive products is con-
sequently extended. Designation of special products followed the example of 
sensitive products.
T A B L E  1 0 .   T a r i f f  R e d u c t i o n  S c e narios  for  Special  Products
Scenario Proportion in tariff line (%) Tariff cut (%)








As shown in Table 11, the mean tariffs after cuts result in 42 to 55 
percent, equivalent extent of 15 to 35 percent cutting rates. The tariff saving 
effects amount to 9 to 25 percentage points which are two times larger than Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 118
the outcomes obtained from using sensitive products. Special products are play-
ing a vital role to alleviate the extent of tariff cuts.
T A B L E  1 1 .   T a r i f f  R e d u c t i ons  for  Special  Products
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Average tariff (%) 42~45 47~51 51~55
4. Tariff Escalation
Judged from the illustrated list of products by the WTO, Korea has relatively 
few applicable products because the country has protected the farm sector by 
imposing higher tariffs on raw agricultural products than processed goods. It is, 
therefore, ‘reverse’ tariff escalation that matters more in the case of Korea. 
Nevertheless, tomatoes, cucumber, peanuts, and sesame seeds are some notice-
able products having a tariff escalation structure. 
Table 12 informs the degree of tariff escalation for selected products. 
The gap between sesame seeds and oil turns out to be the largest by 70 per-
centage points followed by peanuts with 26 percentage points. Under the reduc-
tion by the tiered formula for a developed country’s case, 8 processed products 
including peach and peanuts fall into a grace gap that is within 5 percentage 
points. In addition, if Korea designates sesame seeds and oil as sensitive prod-
ucts, they can also be exempted from the application of this provision. In this 
sense, modality of tariff escalation would not affect the country to the extent 
that it has to counteract the likely adverse impacts. 
TABLE  12.    Selected  Products  of  Tariff  Escalation
Raw Product Processed Products Gap 
(% points) HS Code Product Tariff (%) HS Code Product Tariff (%)
070200 Tomatoes 45
200950 Tomato juice 54 9
210320 Tomato ketchup 54 9
070700 Cucumber 27
071140 Cucumber 45 18
200110 Cucumber 36 9
120210 Peanuts 231 120220 Peanuts 
(unshelled) 256 26
120740 Sesame seeds 630 151550 Sesame oil 700 70Impacts of the Doha Round on Korea's Agricultural Tariff Profile 119
5. Tropical Products
The list of tropical products appears to be extensive in two points. Firstly, it 
has more products than the Uruguay Round list, such as mandarin, orange, rice 
powder and potatoes.8 Secondly, it suggests a number of sensitive products for 
Korea, including rice, red pepper, onion, Korean citrus, potatoes, ginger, nuts 
and green tea. 
Table 13 provides tariff cut results for selected products in accordance 
with the two options. The extent of tariff reductions is far greater than any oth-
er discipline in market access. Thus, some importing members including Korea 
argue against the provision on the ground that the list embraces many products 
that have been grown extensively in non-tropical regions. 
TABLE  13.    Tariff  Reductions  for  Selected  Tropical  Products
HS Code Product Bound Tariff (%) Option 1 Option 2
070190 Potatoes 304 46 22
070310 Onion 135 20 10
070960 Red pepper 270 41 19
071190 Other vegetables 360 54 26
071420 Sweet potatoes 385 58 28
080290 Nuts 567 85 41
080510 Oranges 50 8 15
080520 Mandarin 144 22 10
090210 Green tea 514 77 37
091010 Ginger 377 57 27
120210 Peanuts 231 35 17
151550 Sesame oil 630 95 45
Note: rice is not shown because it is a non-tariffication product.
  8 The UR list covers 54 or 394 products at the HS 4 or 10 digit levels, respectively.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 120
V. Conclusion
The tiered formula for tariff cuts in agricultural modality proposed by the chair 
of the agricultural negotiations is likely to be significant for addressing tariff 
peaks and bringing about tariff harmonization across products and member 
countries. Such bringing about drastic cuts in tariffs is a concern for many im-
porting members including Korea, which hope to achieve gradual and con-
tinuous policy reforms for their agricultural sectors.
It is, therefore, important for importing countries to take full advantage 
of the flexibilities embedded in the modality. One is the provision of sensitive 
products which would help attenuate tariff cuts for important agricultural 
products. But its price tag is quota expansion. The question is to what extent 
the country has to give way quotas in return. Hence, tariff-quota equivalents or 
their trade-offs must be carefully examined before designating sensitive 
products.
The other is to ensure the right to use the provision of special products 
as a developing country. This reminds the overarching issue of Korea on wheth-
er its status as a developing member can be protected in this round. As shown, 
use of special products tends to yield the largest tariff saving effects amounting 
up to 25 percentage points over the baseline cuts. Or the net effects are two 
times greater than the case for sensitive products.
Even if Korea could save the developing country’s membership, it 
would face difficulty in taking full advantage of special products. The WTO is 
likely to press the country to do more. In fact, the revised modality text sug-
gests developing members in a position to do so should make as much addi-
tional efforts in market access as developed members in the areas of tariff esca-
lation and tropical products. In a nutshell, Korea has to make ready for stiff 
challenges in tariff reductions and make every effort to lessen the adverse im-
pact of the Doha Round while accommodating transparent and predictable re-
forms in market access.Impacts of the Doha Round on Korea's Agricultural Tariff Profile 121
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